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I. INTRODUCTION 
 The National Football League (“NFL”) has agreed to 
resolve lawsuits brought by former players who alleged that 
the NFL failed to inform them of and protect them from the 
risks of concussions in football.  The District Court approved 
a class action settlement that covered over 20,000 retired 
players and released all concussion-related claims against the 
NFL.  Objectors have appealed that decision, arguing that 
class certification was improper and that the settlement was 
unfair.  But after thorough review, we conclude that the 
District Court was right to certify the class and approve the 
settlement.  Thus we affirm its decision in full.    
II. BACKGROUND 
 A. Concussion Suits Are Brought Against the  
  NFL  
 In July 2011, 73 former professional football players 
sued the NFL and Riddell, Inc. in the Superior Court of 
California.  Compl., Maxwell v. Nat’l Football League, No. 
BC465842 (Cal. Super. Ct. July 19, 2011).  The retired 
players alleged that the NFL failed to take reasonable actions 
to protect them from the chronic risks of head injuries in 
football.  The players also claimed that Riddell, a 
manufacturer of sports equipment, should be liable for the 
defective design of helmets.   
 The NFL removed the case to federal court on the 
ground that the players’ claims under state law were 
preempted by federal labor law.  More lawsuits by retired 
players followed and the NFL moved under 28 U.S.C. § 1407 
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to consolidate the pending suits before a single judge for 
pretrial proceedings.  In January 2012, the Judicial Panel on 
Multidistrict Litigation consolidated these cases before Judge 
Anita B. Brody in the Eastern District of Pennsylvania as a 
multidistrict litigation (“MDL”).  In re: Nat’l Football 
League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 842 F. Supp. 2d 
1378 (J.P.M.L. 2012).  Since consolidation, 5,000 players 
have filed over 300 similar lawsuits against the NFL and 
Riddell.1  Our appeal only concerns the claims against the 
NFL.   
 To manage the litigation, the District Court appointed 
co-lead class counsel, a Steering Committee, and an 
Executive Committee.  The Steering Committee was charged 
with performing or delegating all necessary pretrial tasks and 
the smaller Executive Committee was responsible for the 
overall coordination of the proceedings.  The Court also 
ordered plaintiffs to submit a Master Administrative Long-
Form Complaint and a Master Administrative Class Action 
Complaint to supersede the numerous then-pending 
complaints.   
 The Master Complaints tracked many of the 
allegations from the first lawsuits.  Football puts players at 
                                              
1 There is also a pending class action against the National 
Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) over its handling 
of head injuries.  In January 2016, the District Court 
overseeing the action preliminarily certified the class and 
approved a settlement subject to certain revisions.  In re: 
Nat’l Collegiate Athletic Ass’n Student-Athlete Concussion 
Injury Litig., No. 13-9116, 2016 WL 305380 (N.D. Ill. Jan. 
26, 2016).  Under the settlement, the NCAA will pay $70 
million to create a medical monitoring fund to screen current 
and former collegiate athletes for brain trauma.        
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risk of repetitive brain trauma and injury because they suffer 
concussive and sub-concussive hits during the game and at 
practice (sub-concussive hits fall below the threshold for a 
concussion but are still associated with brain damage).  
Plaintiffs alleged that the NFL had a duty to provide players 
with rules and information to protect them from the health 
risks—both short and long-term—of brain injury, including 
Alzheimer’s disease, dementia, depression, deficits in 
cognitive functioning, reduced processing speed, loss of 
memory, sleeplessness, mood swings, personality changes, 
and a recently identified degenerative disease called chronic 
traumatic encephalopathy (commonly referred to as “CTE”).   
 Because CTE figures prominently in this appeal, some 
background on this condition is in order.  It was first 
identified in 2002 based on analysis of the brain tissue of 
deceased NFL players, including Mike Webster, Terry Long, 
Andre Waters, and Justin Strzelczyk.  CTE involves the 
build-up of “tau protein” in the brain, a result associated with 
repetitive head trauma.  Medical personnel have examined 
approximately 200 brains with CTE as of 2015, in large part 
because it is only diagnosable post-mortem.  That diagnosis 
requires examining sections of a person’s brain under a 
microscope to see if abnormal tau proteins are present and, if 
so, whether they occur in the unique pattern associated with 
CTE.  Plaintiffs alleged that CTE affects mood and behavior, 
causing headaches, aggression, depression, and an increased 
risk of suicide.  They also stated that memory loss, dementia, 
loss of attention and concentration, and impairment of 
language are associated with CTE.     
 The theme of the allegations was that, despite the 
NFL’s awareness of the risks of repetitive head trauma, the 
League ignored, minimized, or outright suppressed 
information concerning the link between that trauma and 
cognitive damage.  For example, in 1994 the NFL created the 
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Mild Traumatic Brain Injury Committee to study the effects 
of head injuries.  Per the plaintiffs, the Committee was at the 
forefront of a disinformation campaign that disseminated 
“junk science” denying the link between head injuries and 
cognitive disorders.  Based on the allegations against the 
NFL, plaintiffs asserted claims for negligence, medical 
monitoring, fraudulent concealment, fraud, negligent 
misrepresentation, negligent hiring, negligent retention, 
wrongful death and survival, civil conspiracy, and loss of 
consortium.   
 After plaintiffs filed the Master Complaints, the NFL 
moved to dismiss, arguing that federal labor law preempted 
the state law claims.  Indeed, § 301 of the Labor Management 
Relations Act preempts state law claims that are 
“substantially dependent” on the terms of a labor agreement.  
Int’l Bhd. of Elec. Workers v. Hechler, 481 U.S. 851, 852–53 
(1987).  The NFL claimed that resolution of plaintiffs’ claims 
depended upon the interpretation of Collective Bargaining 
Agreements (“CBAs”) in place between the retired players 
and the NFL.2  If the CBAs do preempt plaintiffs’ claims, 
they must arbitrate those claims per mandatory arbitration 
provisions in the CBAs.  Plaintiffs responded that their 
                                              
2 After the NFL removed some of the early concussion-
related lawsuits from state courts, several district courts 
accepted this preemption argument as a basis for denying 
requests to remand the cases.  See, e.g., Smith v. Nat’l 
Football League Players Ass’n, No. 14-1559, 2014 WL 
6776306, at *9 (E.D. Mo. Dec. 2, 2014); Duerson v. Nat’l 
Football League, Inc., No. 12-2513, 2012 WL 1658353, at *6 
(N.D. Ill. May 11, 2012); but see Green v. Arizona Cardinals 
Football Club LLC, 21 F. Supp. 3d 1020, 1030 (E.D. Mo. 
2014) (finding that concussion-related claims did not depend 
on interpretation of CBAs and granting motion to remand).   
 19 
 
negligence and fraud claims would not require federal courts 
to interpret the CBAs and in any event the CBAs did not 
cover all retired players.     
 B. The Parties Reach a Settlement 
 On July 8, 2013, while the NFL’s motion to dismiss 
was pending, the District Court ordered the parties to mediate 
and appointed a mediator.  On August 29, 2013, after two 
months of negotiations and more than twelve full days of 
formal mediation, the parties agreed to a settlement in 
principle and signed a term sheet.  It provided $765 million to 
fund medical exams and offer compensation for player 
injuries.  The proposed settlement would resolve the claims of 
all retired players against the NFL related to head injuries.          
 In January 2014, after more negotiations, class counsel 
filed in the District Court a class action complaint and sought 
preliminary class certification and preliminary approval of the 
settlement.  The Court denied the motion because it had 
doubts that the capped fund for paying claims would be 
sufficient.  In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion 
Injury Litig., 961 F. Supp. 2d 708, 715 (E.D. Pa. 2014).  It 
appointed a Special Master to assist with making financial 
forecasts and, five months later, the parties reached a revised 
settlement that uncapped the fund for compensating retired 
players.   
 Class counsel filed a second motion for preliminary 
class certification and preliminary approval in June 2014.  
The District Court granted the motion, preliminarily approved 
the settlement, conditionally certified the class, approved 
classwide notice, and scheduled a final fairness hearing.  In re 
Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 301 
F.R.D. 191 (E.D. Pa. 2014).  Seven players petitioned for 
interlocutory review.  See Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(f) (“A court of 
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appeals may permit an appeal from an order granting or 
denying class-action certification under this rule if a petition 
for permission to appeal is filed with the circuit clerk within 
14 days after the order is entered.”).  In September 2014, we 
denied the petition, later explaining over a dissent that we 
lacked jurisdiction because the District Court’s order 
preliminarily certifying the class was not an “order granting 
or denying class-action certification.”  In re Nat’l Football 
League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 775 F.3d 570, 571–
72 (3d Cir. 2014).   
 Following preliminary certification, potential class 
members had 90 days to object or opt out of the settlement.  
Class counsel then moved for final class certification and 
settlement approval.  On November 19, 2014, the District 
Court held a day-long fairness hearing and heard argument 
from class counsel, the NFL, and several objectors who 
voiced concerns against the settlement.  After the hearing, the 
Court proposed several changes to benefit class members.  
The parties agreed to the proposed changes and submitted an 
amended settlement in February 2015.  On April 22, 2015, the 
Court granted the motion for class certification and final 
approval of the amended settlement, that grant explained in a 
123-page opinion.  In re Nat’l Football League Players’ 
Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. 351 (E.D. Pa. 2015).  
Objectors filed 12 separate appeals that were consolidated 
into this single appeal before us now.   
 C. The Proposed Settlement 
 The settlement has three components: (1) an uncapped 
Monetary Award Fund that provides compensation for retired 
players who submit proof of certain diagnoses; (2) a $75 
million Baseline Assessment Program that provides eligible 
retired players with free baseline assessment examinations of 
their objective neurological functioning; and (3) a $10 million 
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Education Fund to instruct football players about injury 
prevention.   
 
  1. Monetary Award Fund  
  Under the settlement, retired players or their 
beneficiaries are compensated for developing one of several 
neurocognitive and neuromuscular impairments or 
“Qualifying Diagnoses.”  By “retired players,” we mean 
players who retired from playing NFL football before the 
preliminary approval of the class settlement on July 7, 2014.  
The settlement recognizes six Qualifying Diagnoses: (1) 
Level 1.5 Neurocognitive Impairment; (2) Level 2 
Neurocognitive Impairment;3 (3) Alzheimer’s Disease; (4) 
Parkinson’s Disease; (5) Amyotrophic Lateral Sclerosis 
(“ALS”); and (6) Death with CTE provided the player died 
before final approval of the settlement on April 22, 2015.  A 
retired player does not need to show that his time in the NFL 
caused the onset of the Qualifying Diagnosis.   
 A Qualifying Diagnosis entitles a retired player to a 
maximum monetary award:  
Qualifying Diagnosis    Maximum Award 
Level 1.5 Neurocognitive Impairment $1.5 Million 
Level 2 Neurocognitive Impairment $3 Million 
Parkinson’s Disease    $3.5 Million 
                                              
3 Levels 1.5 and 2 Neurocognitive Impairment require a 
decline in cognitive function and a loss of functional 
capabilities, such as the ability to hold a job, and correspond 
with clinical definitions of mild and moderate dementia.   
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Alzheimer’s Disease   $3.5 Million 
Death with CTE    $4 Million 
ALS      $5 Million 
This award is subject to several offsets, that is, awards 
decrease: (1) as the age at which a retired player is diagnosed 
increases; (2) if the retired player played fewer than five 
eligible seasons; (3) if the player did not have a baseline 
assessment examination; and (4) if the player suffered a 
severe traumatic brain injury or stroke unrelated to NFL play.   
 To collect from the Fund, a class member must register 
with the claims administrator within 180 days of receiving 
notice that the settlement has been approved.  This deadline 
can be excused for good cause.  The class member then must 
submit a claims package to the administrator no later than two 
years after the date of the Qualifying Diagnosis or within two 
years after the supplemental notice is posted on the settlement 
website, whichever is later.  This deadline can be excused for 
substantial hardship.  The claims package must include a 
certification by the diagnosing physician and supporting 
medical records.  The claims administrator will notify the 
class member within 60 days if he is entitled to an award.  
The class member, class counsel, and the NFL have the right 
to appeal an award determination.  To do so, a class member 
must submit a $1,000 fee, which is refunded if the appeal is 
successful and can be waived for financial hardship.  A fee is 
not required for the NFL and class counsel to appeal, though 
the NFL must act in good faith when appealing award 
determinations.   
 The Monetary Award Fund is uncapped and will 
remain in place for 65 years.  Every retired player who timely 
registers and qualifies during the lifespan of the settlement 
will receive an award.  If, after receiving an initial award, a 
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retired player receives a more serious Qualifying Diagnosis, 
he may receive a supplemental award.   
 
  2. Baseline Assessment Program  
 Any retired player who has played at least half of an 
eligible season can receive a baseline assessment 
examination.  It consists of a neurological examination 
performed by credentialed and licensed physicians selected 
by a court-appointed administrator.  Qualified providers may 
diagnose retired players with Level 1, 1.5, or 2 
Neurocognitive Impairment.  The results of the examinations 
can also be compared with any future tests to determine 
whether a retired player’s cognitive abilities have 
deteriorated. 
 Baseline Assessment Program funds will also provide 
Baseline Assessment Program Supplemental Benefits.  
Retired players diagnosed with Level 1 Neurocognitive 
Impairment—evidencing some objective decline in cognitive 
function but not yet early dementia—are eligible to receive 
medical benefits, including further testing, treatment, 
counseling, and pharmaceutical coverage. 
 The Baseline Assessment Program lasts for 10 years.  
All retired players who seek and are eligible for a baseline 
assessment examination receive one notwithstanding the $75 
million cap.  Every eligible retired player age 43 or over must 
take a baseline assessment examination within two years of 
the Program’s start-up.  Every eligible retired player younger 
than age 43 must do so before the end of the program or by 
his 45th birthday, whichever comes first. 
  3. Education Fund 
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 The Education Fund is a $10 million fund to promote 
safety and injury prevention in football.  The purpose is to 
promote safety-related initiatives in youth football and 
educate retired players about their medical and disability 
benefits under the CBA.  Class counsel and the NFL, with 
input from the retired players, will propose specific 
educational initiatives for the District Court’s approval.  
  4. The Proposed Class 
 All living NFL football players who retired from 
playing professional football before July 7, 2014, as well as 
their representative claimants and derivative claimants, 
comprise the proposed class.  Representative claimants are 
those duly authorized by law to assert the claims of deceased, 
legally incapacitated, or incompetent retired players.  
Derivative claimants are those, such as parents, spouses, or 
dependent children, who have some legal right to the income 
of retired players.  Even though the proposed class consists of 
more than just retired players, we use the terms “class 
members” and “retired players” interchangeably.   
 The proposed class contains two subclasses based on a 
retired players’ injuries as of the preliminary approval date.  
Subclass 1 consists of retired players who were not diagnosed 
with a Qualifying Diagnosis prior to July 7, 2014, and their 
representative and derivative claimants.  Put another way, 
subclass 1 includes retired players who have no currently 
known injuries that would be compensated under the 
settlement.  Subclass 2 consists of retired players who were 
diagnosed with a Qualifying Diagnosis prior to July 7, 2014, 
and their representative claimants and derivative claimants.  
Translated, subclass 2 includes retired players who are 
currently injured and will receive an immediate monetary 
award under the settlement.  The NFL estimates that the total 
population of retired players is 21,070.  Of this, 28% are 
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expected to be diagnosed with a compensable disease.  The 
remaining 72% are not expected to develop a compensable 
disease during their lifetime.   
 Class members release all claims and actions against 
the NFL “arising out of, or relating to, head, brain and/or 
cognitive injury, as well as any injuries arising out of, or 
relating to, concussions and/or sub-concussive events,” 
including claims relating to CTE.  The releases do not 
compromise the benefits that retired players are entitled to 
receive under the CBAs, nor do they compromise their 
retirement benefits, disability benefits, and health insurance.   
 Of the over 20,000 estimated class members (the NFL 
states that the number exceeds 21,000), 234 initially asked to 
opt out from the settlement and 205 class members joined 83 
written objections submitted to the District Court.  Before the 
fairness hearing, 26 of the 234 opt-outs sought readmission to 
the class.  After the District Court granted final approval, 
another 6 opt-outs sought readmission.  This leaves 202 
current opt-outs, of which class counsel notes only 169 were 
timely filed.   
III. JURISDICTION & STANDARD OF REVIEW 
 The District Court had jurisdiction over this class 
action settlement under 28 U.S.C. § 1332(d)(2).4  We have 
                                              
4 One objector argues that the District Court failed to 
determine whether it had subject matter jurisdiction over the 
class action because it never decided the NFL’s motion to 
dismiss.  But the NFL’s motion to dismiss would have no 
effect on subject matter jurisdiction because the plaintiffs 
properly alleged jurisdiction based on the diversity of the 
parties and the amount in controversy.  28 U.S.C. § 
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appellate jurisdiction to review its final order approving the 
settlement and certifying the class under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  
 We review the decision to certify a class and approve a 
classwide settlement for abuse of discretion.  In re Blood 
Reagents Antitrust Litig., 783 F.3d 183, 185 n.1 (3d Cir. 
2015); In re Cendant Corp. Litig., 264 F.3d 201, 231 (3d Cir. 
2001).  It exists “if the district court’s decision rests upon a 
clearly erroneous finding of fact, an errant conclusion of law 
or an improper application of law to fact.”  In re Hydrogen 
Peroxide Antitrust Litig., 552 F.3d 305, 312 (3d Cir. 2008) 
(internal quotation omitted).   
 This appeal principally presents two questions—
whether the District Court abused its discretion (1) in 
certifying the class of retired NFL players and (2) in 
concluding that the terms of the settlement were fair, 
reasonable, and adequate.  Objectors (95 in all) have filed 11 
separate briefs totaling some 500 pages addressing these 
questions.  We address each of these arguments, but refer to 
objectors collectively throughout our opinion rather than 
cross-referencing particular objectors with particular 
arguments.   
IV. CLASS CERTIFICATION 
 Rule 23(a) lays out four threshold requirements for 
certification of a class action: (1) numerosity; (2) 
commonality; (3) typicality; and (4) adequacy of 
representation.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(a).  “The parties seeking 
class certification bear the burden of establishing by a 
preponderance of the evidence that the requirements of Rule 
23(a) have been met.”  In re Cmty. Bank of N. Virginia 
                                                                                                     
1332(d)(2).  There was thus no error in declining to decide 
the motion to dismiss.     
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Mortg. Lending Practices Litig., 795 F.3d 380, 391 (3d Cir. 
2015).  If that occurs, we consider whether the class meets the 
requirements of one of three categories of class actions in 
Rule 23(b).  This is a Rule 23(b)(3) class action under which 
we consider whether (1) common questions predominate over 
any questions affecting only individual class members 
(predominance) and (2) class resolution is superior to other 
available methods to decide the controversy (superiority).  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).   
 A. Numerosity 
 Rule 23(a)(1) requires that a class be “so numerous 
that joinder of all members is impracticable.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(a)(1).  There is no magic number of class members needed 
for a suit to proceed as a class action.  We have set a rough 
guidepost in our precedents, however, and stated that 
numerosity is generally satisfied if there are more than 40 
class members.  Marcus v. BMW of N. Am., LLC, 687 F.3d 
583, 595 (3d Cir. 2012) (citing Stewart v. Abraham, 275 F.3d 
220, 226–27 (3d Cir. 2001)).  The District Court found that a 
class of 20,000 retired players would be sufficient for 
numerosity.  In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion 
Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 371.  No objector challenges this 
finding on appeal.   
 B. Commonality 
  “A putative class satisfies Rule 23(a)’s commonality 
requirement if the named plaintiffs share at least one question 
of fact or law with the grievances of the prospective class.”  
Rodriguez v. Nat’l City Bank, 726 F.3d 372, 382 (3d Cir. 
2013) (internal quotation marks omitted).  “Their claims must 
depend upon a common contention . . . that it is capable of 
classwide resolution—which means that determination of its 
truth or falsity will resolve an issue that is central to the 
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validity of each of the claims in one stroke.”  Wal-Mart 
Stores, Inc. v. Dukes, 131 S. Ct. 2541, 2545 (2011).  Meeting 
this requirement is easy enough: “[W]e have acknowledged 
commonality to be present even when not all members of the 
plaintiff class suffered an actual injury, when class members 
did not have identical claims, and, most dramatically, when 
some members’ claims were arguably not even viable.”  In re 
Cmty. Bank, 795 F.3d at 397 (internal citations omitted).   
 The District Court concluded that “critical factual 
questions” were common to all class members, including 
“whether the NFL Parties knew and suppressed information 
about the risks of concussive hits, as well as causation 
questions about whether concussive hits increase the 
likelihood that [r]etired [p]layers will develop conditions that 
lead to Qualifying Diagnoses.”  In re Nat’l Football League 
Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 371.  It also 
found common legal questions, including the “nature and 
extent of any duty owed to [r]etired [p]layers by the NFL 
Parties, and whether [labor] preemption, workers’ 
compensation, or some affirmative defense would bar their 
claims.”  Id.   
 Some objectors argue that commonality was lacking.  
Citing the Supreme Court’s decision in Wal-Mart, they 
contend that the retired players do not share common issues 
of fact or law because they were injured in different ways and 
over different periods of time.  For example, the claims of a 
lineman who played fifteen seasons in the NFL, so goes the 
argument, will share little in common with those of a back-up 
quarterback who played two seasons.   
 These objections miss the mark.  In Wal-Mart, the 
Supreme Court held that commonality was lacking when a 
putative class of 1.5 million female employees alleged sex 
discrimination by their local supervisors.  131 S. Ct. at 2547.  
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The local supervisors had discretion in making employment 
decisions and the class of female employees faced different 
managers making different employment decisions (some 
presumably nondiscriminatory).  Id.  The proposed class thus 
could not identify common questions capable of classwide 
resolution.  Id. at 2553–55.   
 The concerns in Wal-Mart do not apply here because 
the NFL Parties allegedly injured retired players through the 
same course of conduct.  See In re Cmty. Bank, 795 F.3d at 
399 (“Unlike the Wal-Mart plaintiffs, the Plaintiffs in this 
case have alleged that the class was subjected to the same 
kind of illegal conduct by the same entities, and that class 
members were harmed in the same way, albeit to potentially 
different extents.”).  Even if players’ particular injuries are 
unique, their negligence and fraud claims still depend on the 
same common questions regarding the NFL’s conduct.  For 
example, when did the NFL know about the risks of 
concussion?  What did it do to protect players?  Did the 
League conceal the risks of head injuries?  These questions 
are common to the class and capable of classwide resolution.   
 C. Typicality 
 Rule 23(a)(3) requires that the class representatives’ 
claims be “typical of the claims . . . of the class.”  Fed. R. 
Civ. P. 23(a)(3).  This “ensures the interests of the class and 
the class representatives are aligned ‘so that the latter will 
work to benefit the entire class through the pursuit of their 
own goals.’”  Newton v. Merrill Lynch, Pierce, Fenner & 
Smith, Inc., 259 F.3d 154, 182–83 (3d Cir. 2001) (quoting 
Barnes v. Am. Tobacco Co., 161 F.3d 127, 141 (3d Cir. 
1998)).  We also have set a “low threshold” for typicality.  Id. 
at 183.  “‘Even relatively pronounced factual differences will 
generally not preclude a finding of typicality where there is a 
strong similarity of legal theories’ or where the claim arises 
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from the same practice or course of conduct.”  In re 
Prudential Ins. Co. Am. Sales Practice Litig. Agent Actions, 
148 F.3d 283, 311 (3d Cir. 1998) (quoting Baby Neal v. 
Casey, 43 F.3d 48, 58 (3d Cir. 1994)) (alteration omitted). 
 The class representatives, Shawn Wooden and Kevin 
Turner, were named in the class action complaint and were 
selected by class counsel.5  Wooden is a retired player with 
no Qualifying Diagnosis.  Like other retired players without a 
current diagnosis, he sought a baseline assessment 
examination to determine whether he had shown signs of 
cognitive decline and, in the unfortunate event that he 
developed one of the Qualifying Diagnoses, he would seek a 
monetary award.  Turner was a retired player living with 
ALS.6  Like other retired players with currently known 
injuries, he sought a monetary award.  The District Court 
concluded that the claims of Wooden and Turner were 
“typical of those they represent.”  In re Nat’l Football League 
Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 372.  We 
agree.   
                                              
5 In September 2013, one month after the parties signed the 
settlement term sheet, the initial subclass representative for 
players with no currently known injuries, Corey Swinson, 
passed away.  One month later, Wooden took Swinson’s 
place. 
6 We note that Kevin Turner passed away on March 24, 2016.  
Class counsel has moved to substitute as a party Turner’s 
father, Paul Raymond Turner, a motion we will grant.  See 
Fed. R. App. P. 43(a)(1).  For purposes of deciding this 
appeal, it is unnecessary to substitute a new class member as 
subclass representative and we shall continue to refer to 
Kevin Turner as the subclass representative in this opinion.     
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 Some objectors argue that the claims of the class 
representatives are not typical because of factual differences 
between the representatives and other class members, 
including the number of seasons played and injuries caused 
by head trauma.  But class members need not “share identical 
claims,” and “cases challenging the same unlawful conduct 
which affects both the named plaintiffs and the putative class 
usually satisfy the typicality requirement irrespective of the 
varying fact patterns underlying the individual claims.”  Baby 
Neal, 43 F.3d at 56, 58.  What matters is that Wooden and 
Turner seek recovery under the same legal theories for the 
same wrongful conduct as the subclasses they represent.  
Even if the class representatives’ injuries are unique to their 
time in football, the NFL’s alleged fraudulent concealment of 
the risks of head injuries is the same.       
 D. Adequacy of Representation 
 Rule 23(a)(4) requires class representatives to “fairly 
and adequately protect the interests of the class.”  Fed. R. Civ. 
P. 23(a)(4).  It tests the qualifications of class counsel and the 
class representatives.  It also aims to root out conflicts of 
interest within the class to ensure that all class members are 
fairly represented in the negotiations.  Several objectors 
challenge the District Court’s adequacy-of-representation 
finding, but we conclude that it was not an abuse of 
discretion.   
  1. Class Counsel 
 When examining settlement classes, we “have 
emphasized the special need to assure that class counsel: (1) 
possessed adequate experience; (2) vigorously prosecuted the 
action; and (3) acted at arm’s length from the defendant.”  In 
re Gen. Motors Corp. Pick-Up Truck Fuel Tank Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 55 F.3d 768, 801 (3d Cir. 1995) (“GM Trucks”).  Rule 
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23(g) also sets out a non-exhaustive list of factors for courts 
to consider when appointing class counsel.  They include 
counsel’s work in the pending class action, experience in 
handling class actions or other complex litigation, knowledge 
of the applicable law, and the resources available for 
representing the class.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(g). 
 When class counsel and the NFL began mediation, 
there was only one proposed class of all retired players.  Class 
counsel, in consultation with members of the Steering 
Committee and the Executive Committee, decided early in the 
negotiations that creating two separate subclasses “would best 
serve all [c]lass [m]embers’ interests and meet with Due 
Process.”  To that end, class counsel designated lawyers from 
the Steering Committee to serve as subclass counsel.  
 In its final certification and approval order, the District 
Court found that class counsel and subclass counsel were 
experienced in litigating mass torts and personal injury 
actions, vigorously prosecuted the action at arm’s length from 
the NFL, and were able to extract substantial concessions in 
the process.  In re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion 
Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 373.  The Court thus concluded 
that class counsel adequately protected the interests of the 
class.  Id.  No objectors challenge the experience or 
qualifications of class and subclass counsel.  They do make 
two related arguments regarding the adequacy of the subclass 
representation, though neither convinces us that the District 
Court abused its discretion.   
 Objectors first assert that the procedure for selecting 
subclass counsel did not ensure adequate representation 
because subclass counsel came from the team of lawyers 
already negotiating with the NFL.  We agree that class 
counsel could have gone to the District Court and asked it to 
appoint counsel from the outside.  Yet objectors point us to 
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no precedent requiring such a procedure.  Moreover, the 
District Court assured itself that counsel were adequate 
representatives.  They were selected early in the negotiations, 
had already been approved by the District Court to serve on 
the Steering Committee, and were by all accounts active 
participants in the settlement negotiations.  In these 
circumstances, the District Court did not abuse its discretion 
in accepting subclass counsel as adequate representatives. 
 Objectors next press that the subclass counsel for 
future claimants, Arnold Levin, was not an adequate 
representative, as he represented nine players who alleged 
current symptoms in two lawsuits against the NFL.  Levin 
disclosed to the District Court in an application for the 
Steering Committee that he has agreed to fees in these cases 
on a one-third contingency basis.  Objectors argue to us that 
Levin’s representation of these players created a conflict with 
his duties to represent the subclass of retired players with no 
Qualifying Diagnoses.  Yet objectors failed to raise this 
contention in the District Court and did not meaningfully 
assert it on appeal until their reply brief.7  If they had raised 
concerns over Levin’s representation of other players, we 
have no doubt the District Court could ably have addressed 
this argument.  This is part of the reason why we do not 
normally consider arguments not raised in the District 
Court—even in class actions—and deem them waived.  In re 
                                              
7 Alongside the reply brief, objectors also filed a motion 
asking that we take judicial notice of complaints filed by 
retired players where Levin was counsel of record.  The 
motion for judicial notice is unnecessary.  The complaints 
were part of the MDL proceeding and were accessible on the 
MDL docket.  Even if not in the joint appendix, they are part 
of the record on appeal.  See Fed. R. App. P. 10 (record on 
appeal includes papers filed in the District Court).   
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Ins. Brokerage Antitrust Litig., 579 F.3d 241, 261 (3d Cir. 
2009) (“‘Absent exceptional circumstances, this Court will 
not consider issues raised for the first time on appeal.’” 
(quoting Del. Nation v. Pennsylvania, 446 F.3d 410, 416 (3d 
Cir. 2006)).   
 That said, some courts have relaxed the standards for 
waiver in class actions.  See, e.g., In re Sw. Airlines Voucher 
Litig., 799 F.3d 701, 714 (7th Cir. 2015) (“Class members 
were not obliged, on penalty of waiver, to search on their own 
for a conflict of interest on the part of a class 
representative.”).  We agree that the usual waiver rules should 
not be applied mechanically in class actions.  We have an 
independent obligation to protect the interests of the class, 
and in many instances class members are far removed from 
the litigation and lack the information and incentive to object.  
See GM Trucks, 55 F.3d at 784 (“[T]he court plays the 
important role of protector of the absentees’ interests, in a sort 
of fiduciary capacity, by approving appropriate representative 
plaintiffs and class counsel.”).  Accordingly, we retain 
discretion to consider arguments that go to the heart of the 
class settlement’s adequacy and fairness.  Out of caution, we 
decline to apply the penalty of waiver in this instance.   
 Turning to the merits, we do not see how 
representation by Levin created a conflict of interest.  He 
disclosed his representation of the players to the District 
Court, and it was still satisfied that he was an adequate 
representative.  Beyond this, there is no evidence in the 
record before us that the players named in the complaints 
have a current Qualifying Diagnosis.  Rather, they simply 
allege current symptoms that are not themselves Qualifying 
Diagnoses, including memory loss, headaches, mood swings, 
and sensitivity to light.  Many players without a current 
Qualifying Diagnosis presumably have similar symptoms.  
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Accordingly, this is not a situation where subclass counsel 
has clients in both subclasses and there is a risk of a conflict.   
  2. Class Representatives 
 A class representative must represent a class capably 
and diligently.  “[A] minimal degree of knowledge” about the 
litigation is adequate.  New Directions Treatment Servs. v. 
City of Reading, 490 F.3d 293, 313 (3d Cir. 2007) (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The District Court found that the 
class representatives ably discharged their duties by closely 
following the litigation, authorizing the filing of the Class 
Action Complaint, and approving the final settlement.  In re 
Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 
F.R.D. at 375.   
 Some objectors argue that the Court abused its 
discretion in approving Wooden as representative for the 
subclass of players with no Qualifying Diagnoses because he 
did not claim the risk of developing CTE.  This is incorrect.  
In the Class Action Complaint Wooden alleged that he is “at 
increased risk of latent brain injuries caused by . . . repeated 
traumatic head impacts.”  Id. (citing Master Administrative 
Class Action Complaint ¶ 7).  This allegation covers the risk 
of CTE, which is associated with repeated head impacts.  
Moreover, what matters more than the words Wooden used to 
describe his current health are the interests he would have in 
representing the subclass.  Given what we know about CTE, 
Wooden, and all retired NFL players for that matter, are at 
risk of developing the disease and would have an interest in 
compensation for CTE in the settlement.8   
                                              
8 Objectors also argue in passing that the other subclass 
representative, Turner, failed to allege a risk of CTE.  This 
 36 
 
  3. Conflicts of Interest 
 “The adequacy inquiry under Rule 23(a)(4) serves to 
uncover conflicts of interest between named parties and the 
class they seek to represent.”  Amchem Prods., Inc. v. 
Windsor, 521 U.S. 591, 625 (1997).  The “linchpin of the 
adequacy requirement is the alignment of interests and 
incentives between the representative plaintiffs and the rest of 
the class.”  Dewey v. Volkswagen Aktiengesellschaft, 681 
F.3d 170, 183 (3d Cir. 2012).  But not all intra-class conflicts 
are created equal.  If they concern “specific issues in 
controversy,” they are called “fundamental.”  Id. at 184 
(quoting Newberg on Class Actions § 3:26 (4th ed. 2002)).  
This hits the heart of Rule 23(a)(4) and will defeat a finding 
of adequacy.  Id.   
 A recurring fundamental conflict is the divide between 
present and future injury plaintiffs identified in Amchem.  
Counsel in that case sought to approve a class settlement and 
certify a nationwide class of persons—numbering between 
250,000 and 2,000,000—who shared an unfortunate fact in 
common: they were all exposed to asbestos-containing 
products manufactured by 20 companies.  Georgine v. 
Amchem Prods., Inc., 83 F.3d 610, 617 (3d Cir. 1996), aff’d 
sub nom. Amchem Prods., Inc. v. Windsor, 521 U.S. 591 
(1997).  The class settlement purported to resolve the claims 
of persons who had already sustained injuries as a result of 
asbestos exposure (those with present injuries) and those who 
had been exposed to asbestos but had not yet developed any 
injury (those with future injuries, if any injury at all).  The 
District Court approved the settlement and certified the class, 
but we reversed because, among other things, conflicts of 
interest within the class precluded a finding of adequacy.  
                                                                                                     
argument fails for the same reason that it failed with respect 
to Wooden—all players are at risk of CTE.     
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Judge Becker explained that the “most salient” conflict of 
interest was between those with present and future injuries:     
As rational actors, those who are not yet injured 
would want reduced current payouts (through 
caps on compensation awards and limits on the 
number of claims that can be paid each year).  
The futures plaintiffs should also be interested 
in protection against inflation, in not having 
preset limits on how many cases can be 
handled, and in limiting the ability of defendant 
companies to exit the settlement.  Moreover, in 
terms of the structure of the alternative dispute 
resolution mechanism established by the 
settlement, they should desire causation 
provisions that can keep pace with changing 
science and medicine, rather than freezing in 
place the science of 1993.  Finally, because of 
the difficulty in forecasting what their futures 
hold, they would probably desire a delayed opt 
out . . . . 
In contrast, those who are currently injured 
would rationally want to maximize current 
payouts.  Furthermore, currently injured 
plaintiffs would care little about inflation-
protection.  The delayed opt out desired by 
futures plaintiffs would also be of little interest 
to the presently injured; indeed, their interests 
are against such an opt out as the more people 
locked into the settlement, the more likely it is 
to survive.  In sum, presently injured class 
representatives cannot adequately represent the 
futures plaintiffs’ interests and vice versa. 
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Id. at 630–31 (internal footnote omitted).  The Supreme Court 
affirmed on this point and agreed that “the interests of those 
within the single class are not aligned.”  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 
626.   
 To overcome a conflict of interest within a proposed 
class, there must be “structural protections to assure that 
differently situated plaintiffs negotiate for their own unique 
interests.”  Georgine, 83 F.3d at 631.  A common structural 
protection is the creation of discrete subclasses, each with its 
own independent representation.  See Ortiz v. Fibreboard 
Corp., 527 U.S. 815, 856 (1999) (“[A] class divided between 
holders of present and future claims . . . requires division into 
homogenous subclasses . . . with separate representation to 
eliminate conflicting interests of counsel.”).9       
 The District Court found no fundamental conflict of 
interest in this class.  In re Nat’l Football League Players’ 
Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 376.  It explained the 
incentives of class members were aligned because they 
“allegedly were injured by the same scheme: the NFL . . . 
negligently and fraudulently de-emphasized the medical 
effects of concussions to keep [r]etired [p]layers in games.”  
Id.  Moreover, the two subclasses of players guarded against 
any Amchem conflict of interest.  Id.  Turner, the 
                                              
9 Amicus Public Citizen, Inc. argues that the District Court 
should have created additional subclasses to represent each of 
the five Qualifying Diagnoses, the mood and behavior 
symptoms associated with CTE, and spouses of retired 
players with consortium claims.  We agree with the District 
Court that additional subclasses were unnecessary and risked 
slowing or even halting the settlement negotiations.  In re 
Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 
F.R.D. at 379. 
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representative for those with current injuries, “is interested in 
immediately obtaining the greatest possible compensation for 
his injuries and symptoms.”  Id.  Wooden, the representative 
for those who may develop injuries that manifest in the 
future, “is interested in monitoring his symptoms, 
guaranteeing that generous compensation will be available far 
into the future, and ensuring an agreement that keeps pace 
with scientific advances . . . [while] compensat[ing] as many 
conditions as possible.”  Id.  The District Court also cited 
other structural protections, including uncapped and inflation-
adjusted monetary awards, the guarantee of a baseline 
assessment examination, and the presence of a mediator and 
special master.  Id. at 376–77.   
 The Court’s analysis was on point.  Some objectors 
argue that this class action suffers from a conflict of interest 
between present and future injury plaintiffs.  But simply put, 
this case is not Amchem.  The most important distinction is 
that class counsel here took Amchem into account by using 
the subclass structure to protect the sometimes divergent 
interests of the retired players.  The subclasses were 
represented in the negotiations by separate class 
representatives with separate counsel, and, as discussed, each 
was an adequate representative.  This alone is a significant 
structural protection for the class that weighs in favor of 
finding adequacy.   
 Moreover, the terms of the settlement reflect that the 
interests of current and future claimants were represented in 
the negotiations.  The Monetary Award Fund will start paying 
out claims immediately, providing relief to those currently 
living with injuries.  The Fund is uncapped and inflation-
adjusted, protecting the interests of those who worry about 
developing injuries in the future.  The NFL and class counsel 
must meet every ten years and confer in good faith about 
“prospective modifications to the definitions of Qualifying 
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Diagnoses and/or the protocols for making Qualifying 
Diagnoses, in light of generally accepted advances in medical 
science.”  This allows the settlement to keep pace with 
changing science regarding the existing Qualifying 
Diagnoses.  As observed in Georgine, these are the sorts of 
settlement terms that rational actors from both subclasses 
would be interested in when negotiating the resolution of their 
claims.     
   Finally, one of the principal concerns driving 
Amchem’s strict analysis of adequacy of representation was 
the worry that persons with a nebulous risk of developing 
injuries would have little or no reason to protect their rights 
and interests in the settlement.  We have evidence that in this 
case the concern is misplaced because many retired players 
with no currently compensable injuries have already taken 
significant steps to protect their rights and interests.  Of the 
5,000 players who sued the NFL in the MDL proceedings, 
class counsel estimated that 3,900 have no current Qualifying 
Diagnosis.  These 3,900 players are represented, in turn, by 
approximately 300 lawyers.  And with so many sets of eyes 
reviewing the terms of the settlement, the overwhelming 
majority of retired players elected to stay in the class and 
benefit from the settlement.  We thus have little problem 
saying that their interests were adequately represented.   
 Objectors further claim that the settlement’s treatment 
of CTE demonstrates a fundamental conflict of interest 
between present and future injury class members.  Under the 
settlement, retired players who died before final approval of 
the settlement and received a post-mortem CTE diagnosis are 
entitled to an award.  For any player who died after final 
approval, a post-mortem CTE diagnosis is not compensable.  
Objectors cite this difference in recovery as evidence that the 
subclass of players with a Qualifying Diagnosis may have 
bargained away the CTE claims of other players.  GM Trucks, 
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55 F.3d at 797 (“[A] settlement that offers considerably more 
value to one class of plaintiffs than to another may be trading 
the claims of the latter group away in order to enrich the 
former group.”).   
 This argument misunderstands the role of the monetary 
award for CTE.  As the District Court noted in discussing the 
fairness of the settlement, the monetary award “serves as a 
proxy for Qualifying Diagnoses deceased [r]etired [p]layers 
could have received while living.”  In re Nat’l Football 
League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 401–
02 (emphasis in original).  Retired players who were living 
with symptoms associated with one of the other Qualifying 
Diagnoses, but died before approval of the settlement, may 
not have had sufficient notice of the need to be diagnosed.  To 
provide some compensation to these players, the parties 
created an award for the post-mortem diagnosis of CTE.  The 
NFL’s own estimate is that 46 players out of a class 
exceeding at least 20,000 will fall into this category and will 
receive an average award, after offsets, of $1,910,000.  The 
monetary award for CTE is thus an attempt to compensate 
deceased players who would otherwise be unable to get the 
benefits available to the class going forward.  It is not 
evidence of a debilitating conflict of interest in the class 
settlement.10     
                                              
10 Some objectors claim that the District Court erred in 
denying their motion to intervene in May 2014.  In the class-
action context, potential interveners must overcome a 
presumption of adequate representation and “must ordinarily 
demonstrate adversity of interest, collusion, or nonfeasance 
on the part of a party to the suit.”  In re Cmty. Bank of N. 
Virginia, 418 F.3d 277, 315 (3d Cir. 2005).  Objectors have 
not overcome the presumption in this case because, as just 
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 E. Predominance 
 Turning to the additional requirements for certifying a 
class action under Rule 23(b)(3), the class may be maintained 
if “the court finds that the questions of law or fact common to 
class members predominate over any questions affecting only 
individual members.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3).  
Predominance “tests whether proposed classes are sufficiently 
cohesive to warrant adjudication by representation.”  
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623.  “We have previously noted that 
the Rule 23(b)(3) predominance requirement, which is far 
more demanding, incorporates the Rule 23(a) commonality 
requirement.”  In re Warfarin Sodium Antitrust Litig., 391 
F.3d 516, 528 (3d Cir. 2004) (citing In re LifeUSA Holding, 
Inc., 242 F.3d 136, 144 (3d Cir. 2001)).  We are nonetheless 
“more inclined to find the predominance test met in the 
settlement context.”  Sullivan v. DB Investments, Inc., 667 
F.3d 272, 304 n.29 (3d Cir. 2011) (en banc) (internal 
quotation marks and alteration omitted).  
 The District Court found that this class action 
presented predominate factual questions regarding the NFL’s 
knowledge and conduct as well as common scientific 
questions regarding causation.  In re Nat’l Football League 
Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 380–81.  The 
negligence claims “depend on establishing that the NFL . . . 
knew of the dangers of concussive hits, yet failed to modify 
the rules of NFL Football to mitigate them, or even to warn 
[r]etired [p]layers that they were risking serious cognitive 
injury by continuing to play.”  Id. at 380.  The fraud claims 
“suggest a similarly far-reaching scheme, alleging that the . . . 
MTBI Committee repeatedly obfuscated the link between 
                                                                                                     
explained, the class representatives and class counsel were 
adequate.     
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football play and head trauma.”  Id.  We agree with the 
District Court that predominance is satisfied in this case.   
 Objectors argue that damage claims in a mass-tort 
class action such as this are too individualized to satisfy the 
requirements of predominance.  They cite to Amchem where, 
as we have discussed, a nationwide class of persons exposed 
to asbestos could not meet the predominance requirement.  
521 U.S. at 624.  But Amchem itself warned that it does not 
mean that a mass tort case will never clear the hurdle of 
predominance.  Id. at 625 (“Even mass tort cases arising from 
a common cause or disaster may, depending upon the 
circumstances, satisfy the predominance requirement.”).  
Moreover, this class of retired NFL players does not present 
the same obstacles for predominance as the Amchem class of 
hundreds of thousands (maybe millions) of persons exposed 
to asbestos.   
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 F. Superiority 
 Rule 23(b)(3)’s superiority requirement “asks the court 
to balance, in terms of fairness and efficiency, the merits of a 
class action against those of alternative available methods of 
adjudication.”  Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 533–34 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  We consider the class members’ 
interests in individually controlling litigation, the extent and 
nature of any litigation, the desirability or undesirability of 
concentrating the litigation, and the likely difficulties in 
managing a class action.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(b)(3)(A)–(D).  
The District Court found superiority satisfied because “the 
[s]ettlement avoids thousands of duplicative lawsuits and 
enables fast processing of a multitude of claims.”  In re Nat’l 
Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 
F.R.D. at 382.   
 No objectors challenge this conclusion, and we have 
no disagreements with the District Court’s analysis.  At the 
time the settlement was reached, 5,000 players had filed over 
300 lawsuits in the MDL.  Assuming the retired players’ 
claims survived the NFL’s motions to dismiss, the resolution 
of so many individual lawsuits would have presented serious 
challenges for the District Court.  Given our experience with 
similar MDLs, we expect the proceedings would result in 
years of costly litigation and multiple appeals, all the while 
delaying any potential recovery for retired players coping 
with serious health challenges.   
V. CLASS NOTICE 
 When the District Court preliminarily certified the 
class and approved the settlement in July 2014, it directed that 
notice be given to all potential class members.  Notice “is 
designed to summarize the litigation and the settlement and to 
apprise class members of the right and opportunity to inspect 
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the complete settlement documents, papers, and pleadings 
filed in the litigation.”  Prudential, 148 F.3d at 327 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  “Generally speaking, the notice 
should contain sufficient information to enable class members 
to make informed decisions on whether they should take steps 
to protect their rights, including objecting to the settlement or, 
when relevant, opting out of the class.”  In re Baby Prods. 
Antitrust Litig., 708 F.3d 163, 180 (3d Cir. 2013). 
 In our case, the notice informed retired players that a 
settlement was reached and explained what relief the players 
might be eligible for.  The notice also outlined the rights of 
players to object to the settlement and potentially opt out.  If a 
retired player chose to opt out, he would not benefit from the 
settlement but would not release his claims against the NFL.  
Approximately 1% of retired players filed objections to the 
settlement and another 1% elected to opt out.11   
 For a class certified under Rule 23(b)(3), “the court 
must direct to class members the best notice that is 
practicable under the circumstances, including individual 
notice to all members who can be identified through 
reasonable effort.”  Fed R. Civ. P. 23(c)(2)(B).  In addition to 
the requirements of Rule 23, due process further requires that 
notice be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, 
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and 
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”  
Mullane v. Cent. Hanover Bank & Trust Co., 339 U.S. 306, 
314 (1950). 
                                              
11 Some argue that the District Court abused its discretion in 
striking as untimely certain objections to the settlement.  But 
these actions were within the Court’s broad discretion to 
manage the proceedings in a class action.  Hydrogen 
Peroxide, 552 F.3d at 310.    
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 The District Court found that the content of the class 
notice and its distribution to the class satisfied Rule 23 and 
due process.  In re Nat’l Football League Players’ 
Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 383.  One objector 
argues that the notice materials were inadequate because they 
insufficiently disclosed that monetary awards for players are 
subject to reduction on account of applicable Medicare and 
Medicaid liens against a player’s assets.  But the Long-Form 
Notice did discuss possible reductions based on “[a]ny legally 
enforceable liens on the award.”  Id. at 384 n.43 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  The Court found this language 
sufficient because the notice alerts class members to the 
possibility of lien reduction and refers them to the settlement 
where this topic is discussed in detail.  Id.  We agree.    
VI. CLASS SETTLEMENT  
 A class action cannot be settled without court approval 
based on a determination that the proposed settlement is fair, 
reasonable, and adequate.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(e)(2).  The 
inquiry into the settlement’s fairness under Rule 23(e) 
“protects unnamed class members from unjust or unfair 
settlements affecting their rights when the representatives 
become fainthearted before the action is adjudicated or are 
able to secure satisfaction of their individual claims by a 
compromise.”  Amchem, 521 U.S. at 623 (internal quotation 
marks omitted).   
 “The decision of whether to approve a proposed 
settlement of a class action is left to the sound discretion of 
the district court.”  Prudential, 148 F.3d at 299 (internal 
quotation marks omitted).  It “bear[s] the important 
responsibility of protecting absent class members, ‘which is 
executed by the court’s assuring that the settlement represents 
adequate compensation for the release of the class claims.’”  
In re Pet Food Prods., 629 F.3d 333, 349 (3d Cir. 2010) 
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(quoting GM Trucks, 55 F.3d at 805).  In cases of settlement 
classes, where district courts are certifying a class and 
approving a settlement in tandem, they should be “even ‘more 
scrupulous than usual’ when examining the fairness of the 
proposed settlement.”  Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 534 (quoting 
GM Trucks, 55 F.3d at 805).   
 A. Presumption of Fairness 
 We apply an initial presumption of fairness in 
reviewing a class settlement when: “(1) the negotiations 
occurred at arms length; (2) there was sufficient discovery; 
(3) the proponents of the settlement are experienced in similar 
litigation; and (4) only a small fraction of the class objected.”  
Cendant, 264 F.3d at 232 n.18.  The District Court found each 
of these elements satisfied and applied the presumption.  In re 
Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 
F.R.D. at 387–88.  Objectors argue that the presumption 
should not have applied at all because class counsel did not 
conduct formal discovery into the fraud and negligence 
claims against the NFL before reaching the settlement.  We 
conclude that the Court did not abuse its discretion in finding 
class counsel’s informal discovery to be sufficient.   
 By the time of the settlement, class counsel had 
undertaken significant informal discovery.  For instance, they 
had obtained a comprehensive database of the claims and 
symptoms of retired players and had enlisted the assistance of 
medical experts.  They also had a grasp of the legal hurdles 
that the retired players would need to clear in order to succeed 
on their fraud and negligence claims, in particular the 
potentially dispositive issue of federal labor law preemption.  
Thus, in negotiations with the NFL class counsel “were aware 
of the strengths and weaknesses of their case.”  In re Nat’l 
Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 
F.R.D. at 387.  To the extent objectors ask us to require 
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formal discovery before presuming that a settlement is fair, 
we decline the invitation.  In some cases, informal discovery 
will be enough for class counsel to assess the value of the 
class’ claims and negotiate a settlement that provides fair 
compensation.  See In re Processed Egg Prods. Antitrust 
Litig., 284 F.R.D. 249, 267 (E.D. Pa. 2012) (applying 
presumption in part because, “although no formal discovery 
was conducted . . . , [class counsel] conducted informal 
discovery, including, inter alia, independently investigating 
the merits”).   
 B. Girsh & Prudential Factors 
 In Girsh v. Jepson, we noted nine factors to be 
considered when determining the fairness of a proposed 
settlement:  
(1) the complexity, expense and likely duration 
of the litigation; (2) the reaction of the class to 
the settlement; (3) the stage of the proceedings 
and the amount of discovery completed; (4) the 
risks of establishing liability; (5) the risks of 
establishing damages; (6) the risks of 
maintaining the class action through the trial; 
(7) the ability of the defendants to withstand a 
greater judgment; (8) the range of 
reasonableness of the settlement fund in light of 
the best possible recovery; and (9) the range of 
reasonableness of the settlement fund to a 
possible recovery in light of all the attendant 
risks of litigation.  
521 F.2d 153, 157 (3d Cir. 1975) (internal quotation marks 
and ellipses omitted).  “The settling parties bear the burden of 
proving that the Girsh factors weigh in favor of approval of 
the settlement.”  In re Pet Food Prods., 629 F.3d at 350.  A 
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district court’s findings under the Girsh test are those of fact.  
Unless clearly erroneous, they are upheld.  Id.   
 Later, in Prudential Insurance we held that, because of 
a “sea-change in the nature of class actions,” it might be 
useful to expand the Girsh factors to include several 
permissive and non-exhaustive factors:   
[1] the maturity of the underlying substantive 
issues, as measured by experience in 
adjudicating individual actions, the 
development of scientific knowledge, the extent 
of discovery on the merits, and other factors 
that bear on the ability to assess the probable 
outcome of a trial on the merits of liability and 
individual damages; [2] the existence and 
probable outcome of claims by other classes 
and subclasses; [3] the comparison between the 
results achieved by the settlement for individual 
class or subclass members and the results 
achieved—or likely to be achieved—for other 
claimants; [4] whether class or subclass 
members are accorded the right to opt out of the 
settlement; [5] whether any provisions for 
attorneys’ fees are reasonable; and [6] whether 
the procedure for processing individual claims 
under the settlement is fair and reasonable.  
148 F.3d at 323.  “Unlike the Girsh factors, each of which the 
district court must consider before approving a class 
settlement, the Prudential considerations are just that, 
prudential.”  In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 174.   
 The District Court in our case went through the Girsh 
factors and the relevant Prudential factors in great detail 
before concluding that the terms of the settlement were fair, 
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reasonable, and adequate.  In re Nat’l Football League 
Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 388–96.  
Objectors try to challenge the District Court’s analysis in 
several ways, but none convinces us.   
  1. Complexity, Expense, and Likely   
   Duration of the Litigation 
 “The first factor ‘captures the probable costs, in both 
time and money, of continued litigation.’”  Warfarin, 391 
F.3d at 535–36 (quoting Cendant, 264 F.3d at 233).  The 
District Court concluded that the probable costs of continued 
litigation in the MDL were significant and that this factor 
weighed in favor of approving the settlement.  In re Nat’l 
Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 
F.R.D. at 388–89.  Some objectors assert that the District 
Court overestimated the costs of continued litigation because 
the negligence and fraud claims were “straightforward.”  This 
is not the case.  Over 5,000 retired NFL players in the MDL 
alleged a multi-decade fraud by the NFL, and litigating these 
claims would have been an enormous undertaking.  The 
discovery needed to prove the NFL’s fraudulent concealment 
of the risks of concussions was extensive.  The District Court 
would then resolve many issues of causation and medical 
science.  Finally, if the cases did not settle or were not 
dismissed, individual suits would be remanded to district 
courts throughout the country for trial.  We agree with the 
District Court that the expense of this process weighs strongly 
in the settlement’s favor.   
  2. Reaction of the Class to the Settlement 
 “The second Girsh factor ‘attempts to gauge whether 
members of the class support the settlement.’”  Warfarin, 391 
F.3d at 536 (quoting Prudential, 148 F.3d at 318).  As noted, 
the case began with a class of approximately 20,000 retired 
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players, of which 5,000 are currently represented by counsel 
in the MDL proceedings.  Notice of the settlement reached an 
estimated 90% of those players through direct mail and 
secondary publications (in addition to the extensive national 
media coverage of this case).  As of 10 days before the 
fairness hearing, more than 5,200 class members had signed 
up to receive additional information about the settlement and 
the settlement website had more than 64,000 unique visitors.  
With all this attention, only approximately 1% of class 
members objected and approximately 1% of class members 
opted out.  We agree with the District Court that these figures 
weigh in favor of settlement approval.  In re Nat’l Football 
League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 389. 
 Some note that the percentage of objectors was even 
lower in GM Trucks, a case where we declined to approve a 
settlement.  There, “[o]f approximately 5.7 million class 
members, 6,450 owners objected and 5,203 opted out.”  GM 
Trucks, 55 F.3d at 813 n.32.  But in GM we looked past the 
low objection rate because there were “other indications that 
the class reaction to the suit was quite negative,” including 
our concern that the passive victims of a product defect 
lacked “adequate interest and information to voice 
objections.”  Id. at 813.  Those concerns are not present here.  
By the time of the settlement, many of the retired players in 
this class already had counsel and had sued the NFL, 
suggesting that their claims were valuable enough to pursue 
in court and that the players were informed enough to 
evaluate the settlement.12   
                                              
12 Others argue that we cannot rely on the reaction of the class 
because the class notice was “problematic.”  They claim that 
the notice may have misled class members about 
compensation for those with a post-mortem CTE diagnosis.  
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  3. Stage of the Proceedings and Amount of  
   Discovery Completed 
 “The third Girsh factor ‘captures the degree of case 
development that class counsel [had] accomplished prior to 
settlement.  Through this lens, courts can determine whether 
counsel had an adequate appreciation of the merits of the case 
before negotiating.’”  Warfarin, 391 F.3d at 537 (quoting 
Cendant, 264 F.3d at 235).   
 The District Court concluded that class counsel 
adequately evaluated the merits of the preemption and 
causation issues through informal discovery, and, after ten 
months of settlement negotiations, the stage of the 
proceedings weighed in favor of settlement approval.  In re 
Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 
F.R.D. at 390.  Objectors claim that the lack of formal 
discovery in this matter should have weighed more heavily 
against settlement.  As with the presumption of fairness, 
formal discovery is not a requirement for the third Girsh 
factor.  What matters is not the amount or type of discovery 
class counsel pursued, but whether they had developed 
enough information about the case to appreciate sufficiently 
the value of the claims.  Moreover, requiring parties to 
conduct formal discovery before reaching a proposed class 
settlement would take a valuable bargaining chip—the costs 
of formal discovery itself—off the table during negotiations.  
This could deter the early settlement of disputes.   
  4. Risks of Establishing Liability and  
   Damages 
                                                                                                     
But the District Court explained that the class notice was 
clear that only some cases of CTE would be compensated.  In 
re Nat’l Football League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 
307 F.R.D. at 383–84. 
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 “The fourth and fifth Girsh factors survey the possible 
risks of litigation in order to balance the likelihood of success 
and the potential damage award if the case were taken to trial 
against the benefits of an immediate settlement.”  Prudential, 
148 F.3d at 319.  We concur with the District Court that this 
factor weighed in favor of settlement because class members 
“face[d] stiff challenges surmounting the issues of preemption 
and causation.”  In re Nat’l Football League Players’ 
Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 391.   
 To start, if the NFL were to prevail in its motion to 
dismiss on the issue of federal labor law preemption, “many, 
if not all,” of the class members’ claims would be dismissed.  
Id.  Objectors claim the District Court misjudged the risks of 
establishing liability and damages on this front.  They argue 
that the NFL’s preemption defense would not apply to all 
class members because there were no CBAs in effect before 
1968 and between 1987 and 1993.  But even if there were a 
small subset of players unaffected by the preemption defense, 
the defense still had the capability of denying relief to the 
majority of class members and this weighs in favor of 
approving the settlement.   
 As for causation, the District Court noted that retired 
players would need to show both general causation (that 
repetitive head trauma is capable of causing ALS, 
Alzheimer’s, and the like), and specific causation (that the 
brain trauma suffered by a particular player in fact caused his 
specific impairments).  In re Nat’l Football League Players’ 
Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 393.  With general 
causation, the Court found that even though “[a] consensus is 
emerging that repetitive mild brain injury is associated with 
the Qualifying Diagnoses,” the “available research is not 
nearly robust enough to discount the risks” of litigation.  Id.  
And specific causation would be even more troublesome 
because a player would need to distinguish the effect of hits 
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he took during his NFL career from the effect of those he 
received in high school football, college football, or other 
contact sports.  Objectors argue that the District Court put too 
little faith in the ability of the class to show causation because 
the NFL has admitted that concussions can lead to long-term 
problems and formal discovery could disclose that it 
fraudulently concealed the risks of concussions.  But neither 
of these points is particularly helpful for overcoming the 
general and specific causation hurdles the District Court 
identified.  
  5. Risks of Maintaining Class Action  
   Through Trial 
 The District Court found that the likelihood of 
obtaining and keeping a class certification if the action were 
to proceed to trial weighed in favor of approving the 
settlement, but it deserved only minimal consideration.  Id. at 
394.  This was correct.  In a settlement class, this factor 
becomes essentially “toothless” because “‘a district court 
need not inquire whether the case, if tried, would present 
intractable management problems[,] . . . for the proposal is 
that there be no trial.’”  Prudential, 148 F.3d at 321 (quoting 
Amchem, 521 U.S. at 620).    
  6. Ability of Defendants to Withstand a  
   Greater Judgment 
 The seventh Girsh factor is most relevant when the 
defendant’s professed inability to pay is used to justify the 
amount of the settlement.  In the case of the NFL, the District 
Court found this factor neutral because the NFL did not cite 
potential financial instability as justification for the 
settlement’s size.  In re Nat’l Football League Players’ 
Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 394.  In fact, it agreed 
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to uncap the Monetary Award Fund and is thus duty bound to 
pay every compensable claim.   
 Some objectors complain that the settlement, which 
may cost the NFL $1 billion over its lifetime, represents a 
“fraction of one year’s revenues.”  Even so, that does not 
change the analysis of this Girsh factor.  Indeed, “‘in any 
class action against a large corporation, the defendant entity is 
likely to be able to withstand a more substantial judgment, 
and, against the weight of the remaining factors, this fact 
alone does not undermine the reasonableness of the . . . 
settlement.’”  Sullivan, 667 F.3d at 323 (quoting Weber v. 
Gov’t Empl. Ins. Co., 262 F.R.D. 431, 447 (D.N.J. 2009)). 
  7. Range of Reasonableness of the   
   Settlement in Light of the Best Possible  
   Recovery and All Attendant Risks of  
   Litigation 
 In evaluating the eighth and ninth Girsh factors, we 
ask “whether the settlement represents a good value for a 
weak case or a poor value for a strong case.”  Warfarin, 391 
F.3d at 538.  “The factors test two sides of the same coin: 
reasonableness in light of the best possible recovery and 
reasonableness in light of the risks the parties would face if 
the case went to trial.”  Id.   “[T]he present value of the 
damages plaintiffs would likely recover if successful, 
appropriately discounted for the risk of not prevailing, should 
be compared with the amount of the proposed settlement.”  
Prudential, 148 F.3d at 322 (quotation omitted).   
 If the retired players were successful in their fraud and 
negligence claims, they would likely be entitled to substantial 
damages awards.  But we must take seriously the litigation 
risks inherent in pressing forward with the case.  The NFL’s 
pending motion to dismiss and other available affirmative 
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defenses could have left retired players to pursue claims in 
arbitration or with no recovery at all.  Hence we agree with 
the District Court that the settlement represents a fair deal for 
the class when compared with a risk-adjusted estimate of the 
value of plaintiffs’ claims.  In re Nat’l Football League 
Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 395.     
 Objectors claim that the District Court should have 
taken into account the costs to class members of the 
registration and claims administration process because they 
decrease the “real value” for the class.  But these costs are not 
relevant to the eighth and ninth Girsh factors.  And in any 
event the Court assured itself that the claims process was 
“reasonable in light of the substantial monetary awards . . . 
and imposes no more requirements than necessary.”  Id. at 
396.13    
  8. Prudential Factors  
 The District Court found that the relevant Prudential 
factors also weighed in favor of approving the settlement.  Id. 
at 395–96.  No objectors engage with the Court’s findings on 
this front.  But briefly, we agree that class counsel was able to 
assess the probable outcome of this case, class members had 
the opportunity to opt out, and the claims process is 
reasonable.  The provision of attorneys’ fees was a neutral 
factor because class counsel has not yet moved for a fee 
award.     
 C. Settlement’s Treatment of CTE  
                                              
13 The argument that the settlement’s failure to compensate 
CTE makes it a poor value for the class we discuss separately 
below. 
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  Objectors raise other arguments about the fairness of 
the settlement that do not necessarily fall neatly within one of 
the Girsh factors.  The most common of those arguments is 
that the exclusion of CTE as a Qualifying Diagnosis for 
future claimants is unfair.  Objectors note that CTE, the 
“industrial disease of football,” was at the center of the first 
concussion lawsuits and argue that claims for CTE 
compensation are released by the settlement in return for 
nothing.  The District Court carefully considered this 
argument before deciding that the settlement’s treatment of 
CTE was reasonable.  It made detailed factual findings about 
the state of medical science regarding CTE—findings that we 
review for clear error—in support of this conclusion.   
 The Court first determined that “[t]he study of CTE is 
nascent, and the symptoms of the disease, if any, are 
unknown.”  Id. at 397.  Surveying the available medical 
literature, it found that researchers have not “reliably 
determined which events make a person more likely to 
develop CTE” and “have not determined what symptoms 
individuals with CTE typically suffer from while they are 
alive.”  Id. at 398.  At the time of the Court’s decision, only 
about 200 brains with CTE had been examined, and the only 
way currently to diagnose CTE is a post-mortem examination 
of the subject’s brain.  Id.   
 Citing studies by Dr. Ann McKee and Dr. Robert 
Stern, objectors argued that CTE progresses in four stages.  In 
Stages I and II, the disease affects mood and behavior while 
leaving a retired player’s cognitive functions largely intact.  
Headaches, aggression, depression, explosive outbursts, and 
suicidal thoughts are common.  Later in life, as a retired 
player progresses to Stages III and IV, severe memory loss, 
dementia, loss of attention and concentration, and impairment 
of language begin to occur.  The District Court explained, 
however, that these studies suffer from several limitations and 
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cannot generate “[p]redictive, generalizable conclusions” 
about CTE.  Id. at 399.  The studies suffered from a selection 
bias because they only examined patients with a history of 
repetitive head injury.  They had to rely on reports by family 
members to reconstruct the symptoms patients showed before 
death.  And they did not take into account other potential risk 
factors for developing CTE, including a high Body Mass 
Index (“BMI”), lifestyle change, age, chronic pain, or 
substance abuse.  Id. at 398–99.    
 With this science in mind, the Court next determined 
that certain symptoms associated with CTE, such as memory 
loss, executive dysfunction, and difficulty with concentration, 
are compensated by the existing Qualifying Diagnoses.  Id.  
And many persons diagnosed with CTE after death suffered 
from conditions in life that are compensated, including ALS, 
Alzheimer’s disease, and Parkinson’s disease.  Relying on 
expert evidence, the Court estimated that “at least 89% of the 
former NFL players” who were examined in CTE studies 
would have been compensated under the settlement.  Id.   
 To be sure, the mood and behavioral symptoms 
associated with CTE (aggression, depression, and suicidal 
thoughts) are not compensated, but this result was reasonable.  
Mood and behavioral symptoms are common in the general 
population and have multifactor causation and many other 
risk factors.  Id. at 401.  Retired players tend to have many of 
these risk factors, such as sleep apnea, a history of drug and 
alcohol abuse, a high BMI, chronic pain, and major lifestyle 
changes.  Id.  Class members would thus “face more 
difficulty proving that NFL Football caused these mood and 
behavioral symptoms than they would proving that it caused 
other symptoms associated with Qualifying Diagnoses.”  Id. 
 The District Court also reviewed the monetary award 
for post-mortem diagnoses of CTE.  It found “[s]ound 
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reasons” for limiting the award to players who died before 
final approval of the settlement.  Id.  As we have summarized 
elsewhere, this compensation for deceased players is a proxy 
for Qualifying Diagnoses a retired player could have received 
while living.  After final approval, players “should be well 
aware of the [s]ettlement and the need to obtain Qualifying 
Diagnoses,” and “there no longer is a need for Death with 
CTE to serve as a proxy for Qualifying Diagnoses.”  Id. at 
402.  
 Finally, the Court addressed the potential development 
of scientific and medical knowledge of CTE.  Objectors 
argued that the settlement’s treatment of CTE was 
unreasonable in light of the expected developments in CTE 
research.  But even if a diagnosis of CTE during life will be 
available in the next five or ten years, “the longitudinal 
epidemiological studies necessary to build a robust clinical 
profile will still take a considerable amount of time.”  Id.  The 
Court also noted that the settlement has some mechanism for 
keeping pace with science, in that the parties must meet and 
confer every ten years in good faith about possible 
modifications to the definitions of Qualifying Diagnoses.  Id. 
at 403   
 Objectors have not shown any of the District Court’s 
findings to be clearly erroneous, which exists when, 
“although there is evidence to support [the finding], the 
reviewing court, based on the entire evidence, concludes with 
firm conviction that a mistake has been made.”  GM Trucks, 
55 F.3d at 783.  Objectors argue that the Court overlooked 
certain expert evidence, but the record does not support this 
contention.  They also complain that it failed to weigh the 
credibility of the different experts when the objectors’ experts 
were not paid for their services.  We do not see how the Court 
could have made a proper credibility determination on the 
basis of written declarations alone, and, in any event, we have 
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never required those determinations when considering the 
fairness of a settlement.   
 Others claim that the expert evidence on CTE should 
have been analyzed under Daubert v. Merrell Dow 
Pharmaceuticals, Inc., 509 U.S. 579 (1993), which 
established threshold standards for the admissibility of expert 
scientific testimony at trial.  Objectors failed to present this 
argument to the District Court, and we deem it waived.  In re 
Ins. Brokerage, 579 F.3d at 261.  Moreover, we have never 
held that district courts considering the fairness of a class 
action settlement should consider the admissibility of expert 
evidence under Daubert.  And at least one court of appeals 
has rejected the argument objectors are making because, “[i]n 
a fairness hearing, the judge does not resolve the parties’ 
factual disputes but merely ensures that the disputes are real 
and that the settlement fairly and reasonably resolves the 
parties’ differences.”  Int’l Union, United Auto., Aerospace, 
& Agr. Implement Workers of Am. v. Gen. Motors Corp., 497 
F.3d 615, 636–37 (6th Cir. 2007).      
 Finding no clear errors in the District Court’s findings 
on CTE, we are also convinced that the Court was well within 
its discretion in concluding that the settlement’s treatment of 
this condition was reasonable.  Most importantly, objectors 
are not correct when they assert that CTE claims are released 
by the settlement in return for “nothing.”  A primary purpose 
of the settlement is to provide insurance for living players 
who develop certain neurocognitive or neuromuscular 
impairments linked to repetitive head trauma (in addition to 
the benefits provided by the Baseline Assessment Program).  
Given what we know about CTE, many of the symptoms 
associated with the disease will be covered by this insurance.  
And compensation for players who are coping with these 
symptoms now is surely preferable to waiting until they die to 
pay their estates for a CTE diagnosis.  Moreover, we agree 
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with the District Court that it would be an uphill battle to 
compensate for the mood and behavioral symptoms thought 
to be associated with CTE.   
 Before concluding, we address developments during 
the pendency of this appeal.  In a March 2016 roundtable 
discussion on concussions organized by the House Energy & 
Commerce Subcommittee on Oversight & Investigations, the 
NFL’s Executive Vice President cited the research of Dr. 
McKee and agreed that there was a link between football and 
degenerative brain disorders like CTE.  The NFL’s statement 
is an important development because it is the first time, as far 
as we can tell, that the NFL has publicly acknowledged a 
connection between football and CTE.  On the other hand, the 
NFL is now conceding something already known.  The sheer 
number of deceased players with a post-mortem diagnosis of 
CTE supports the unavoidable conclusion that there is a 
relationship, if not a causal connection, between a life in 
football and CTE.   
 Objectors cite the NFL’s concession as further 
evidence that this settlement should be rejected.  They argue 
that the NFL has now admitted there is a link between 
football and CTE, yet refused to compensate the disease.  
Again, we note that the settlement does compensate many of 
the impairments associated with CTE, though it does not 
compensate CTE as a diagnosis (with the exception of players 
who died before final approval of the settlement).  Moreover, 
even if the NFL has finally come around to the view that 
there is a link between CTE and football, many more 
questions must be answered before we could say that the 
failure to compensate the diagnosis was unreasonable.  For 
example, we still cannot reliably determine the prevalence, 
symptoms, or risk factors of CTE.  The NFL’s recent 
acknowledgment may very well advance the public 
discussion of the risks of contact sports, but it did not advance 
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the science.  Accordingly, the NFL’s statement is not a 
ground for reversal of the settlement’s approval. 
 In the end, this settlement was the bargain struck by 
the parties, negotiating amid the fog of litigation.  If we were 
drawing up a settlement ourselves, we may want different 
terms or more compensation for a certain condition.  But our 
role as judges is to review the settlement reached by the 
parties for its fairness, adequacy, and reasonableness.  And 
when exercising that role, we must “guard against demanding 
too large a settlement based on [our] view of the merits of the 
litigation; after all, settlement is a compromise, a yielding of 
the highest hopes in exchange for certainty and resolution.”  
GM Trucks, 55 F.3d at 806.  This settlement will provide 
significant and immediate relief to retired players living with 
the lasting scars of a NFL career, including those suffering 
from some of the symptoms associated with CTE.  We must 
hesitate before rejecting that bargain based on an unsupported 
hope that sending the parties back to the negotiating table 
would lead to a better deal.  Accordingly, we conclude that 
the settlement’s treatment of CTE does not render the 
agreement fundamentally unfair.14 
                                              
14 We address a few remaining objections to the District 
Court’s fairness inquiry.  Some claim that the offsets in the 
settlement that reduce a player’s monetary award were 
unreasonable.  The Court explained why each offset had 
scientific support and we are content to say that objectors 
have not shown its findings to be clearly in error or its 
conclusions an abuse of discretion.  In re Nat’l Football 
League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 407–
11.  Others argue that the settlement should have used the 
definition of “eligible season” set forth in the NFL retirement 
plan.  We concur with the District Court that the definition of 
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VII. ATTORNEYS’ FEES  
 Class counsel and the NFL did not negotiate the issue 
of fees until after the initial term sheet was signed.  After 
negotiations, the NFL agreed not to contest any award of 
attorneys’ fees and costs up to $112.5 million.  Any fee award 
will be separate from the NFL’s obligations under the 
settlement to pay monetary awards to the retired players.  
Class counsel may also petition the District Court to set aside 
5% of each monetary award to administer the settlement.  The 
petition for a fee award will be submitted to the Court at a 
later date.  Objectors will then be able to present arguments as 
to why the requested award is improper, and the Court will 
have discretion to modify the award in whatever way it sees 
fit.  Even though the issue of attorneys’ fees remains 
undecided, some object that the settlement’s treatment of fees 
is a reason for reversal.   
 A. Deferral of Fee Petition 
 Objectors first argue that the District Court abused its 
discretion in approving the procedure for attorneys’ fees.  As 
noted, class counsel will request a fee award after the class 
action is certified and the class settlement is approved.  
Objectors claim that the “attorney-fee-deferral procedure” 
violated Federal Rule of Civil Procedure Rule 23(h) and 
deprived class members of due process.  We note at the outset 
that objectors failed to present most of the elements of this 
argument to the Court at the final fairness hearing.  The 
closest anyone came was when amicus Public Citizen, Inc. 
claimed that the absence of a fee petition “prevents a 
complete evaluation of the fairness of the settlement at this 
point.”  In response, the Court noted that interested parties 
                                                                                                     
eligible season in the settlement was reasonable because it is 
a proxy for the number of head injuries.  Id. at 410.      
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would have an opportunity to object to the fee petition when 
filed and that the separation of settlement approval from fee 
approval was an “accepted approach.”  In re Nat’l Football 
League Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 396. 
 As discussed elsewhere, the standards for waiver may 
be relaxed somewhat in the class action context because we 
have an independent obligation to protect the rights of absent 
class members.  Applying this principle, we will reach the 
objections concerning attorneys’ fees because, if the 
objections are persuasive, class members were denied a 
meaningful chance to object or opt out from the settlement.  
Our review, however, confirms that the procedure for 
awarding fees in this settlement was neither an unlawful 
procedure nor an obstacle to approval.  We have no doubt 
that, at the specified time, class counsel’s fee petition will be 
subject to careful review by the District Court and objectors 
will present challenges to the fee petition if warranted.       
 To start, the practice of deferring consideration of a fee 
award is not so irregular.  We have seen the same 
arrangement in the settlement of a products liability class 
action related to diet drugs.  In re Diet Drugs Prods. Liab. 
Litig., 582 F.3d 524, 534–35 (3d Cir. 2009) (settlement 
approved in 2002, interim and final fee awards approved in 
2009).  Other courts have also used the same procedure.  E.g., 
In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon in Gulf of 
Mexico, 910 F. Supp. 2d 891, 918 (E.D. La. 2012), aff’d sub 
nom. In re Deepwater Horizon, 739 F.3d 790 (5th Cir. 2014); 
see also Newberg on Class Actions § 14:5 (5th ed.) (“In some 
situations, the court will give final approval to a class action 
settlement and leave fees and costs for a later 
determination.”).   
 Moreover, the separation of a fee award from final 
approval of the settlement does not violate Rule 23(h), which 
 65 
 
allows a court to award reasonable attorneys’ fees and costs 
in a certified class action subject to certain requirements.  
Nowhere does the provision require that class counsel move 
for its fee award at the same time that it moves for final 
approval of the settlement.  Under the Rule, a fee petition 
must be made by motion served on all parties and, when the 
motion is made by class counsel, notice must be “directed to 
class members in a reasonable manner.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
23(h)(1).  Class members may then object and the court may 
hold a hearing.  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(2)–(3).  And the court 
“must find the facts and state its legal conclusions” and “may 
refer issues related to the amount of the award to a special 
master.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(3)–(4).  So long as these 
conditions are met, the procedure for awarding attorneys’ fees 
that the District Court approved in this case will not run afoul 
of subsection (h).   
 Objectors point us to the Advisory Committee Notes to 
Rule 23, which seem to contemplate combining class notice 
of the fee petition with notice of the terms of the settlement.  
Fed. R. Civ. P. 23(h)(1), 2003 advisory committee’s note 
(“For motions by class counsel in cases subject to court 
review of a proposed settlement under Rule 23(e), it would be 
important to require the filing of at least the initial motion in 
time for inclusion of information about the motion in the 
notice to the class about the proposed settlement that is 
required by Rule 23(e).”) & (“In cases in which settlement 
approval is contemplated under Rule 23(e), notice of class 
counsel’s fee motion should be combined with notice of the 
proposed settlement, and the provision regarding notice to the 
class is parallel to the requirements for notice under Rule 
23(e).”); see also Newberg on Class Actions § 8.24 (5th ed.) 
(Rule 23 envisions “linking together settlement notice and 
objections with fee notices and objections”).  But even if we 
were willing to read the Advisory Committee’s suggestion 
that fee petitions be filed alongside the settlement as a 
 66 
 
requirement, “it is the Rule itself, not the Advisory 
Committee’s description of it, that governs.”  Dukes, 131 S. 
Ct. at 2559.   
 Objectors also cite as support two cases from other 
circuits that found a violation of Rule 23(h).  See Redman v. 
RadioShack Corp., 768 F.3d 622, 638 (7th Cir. 2014), cert. 
denied sub nom. Nicaj v. Shoe Carnival, Inc., 135 S. Ct. 1429 
(2015); In re Mercury Interactive Corp. Sec. Litig., 618 F.3d 
988, 993 (9th Cir. 2010).  They are not, however, as helpful 
as objectors might think.  In those cases, the district courts 
denied class members the opportunity to object to the 
particulars of counsel’s fee request because counsel were not 
required to file a fee petition until after the deadline for class 
members to object expired.  By the time they were served 
with notice of the fee petition, it was too late for them to 
object.  We have little trouble agreeing that Rule 23(h) is 
violated in those circumstances.  But in our case the fee 
petition has not yet been filed, the District Court has not set a 
deadline for objections to the fee petition, and the issue of 
whether class members will have an opportunity to object is 
hypothetical.  Accordingly, we decline to hold that Rule 23(h) 
mandates the simultaneous notice of a class action settlement 
and notice of the fee petition.   
 The final argument raised by objectors on this point is 
that the decision to delay ruling on the fee award deprived 
class members of due process.  As we discussed in evaluating 
classwide notice, constitutional due process requires that 
notice be “reasonably calculated, under all the circumstances, 
to apprise interested parties of the pendency of the action and 
afford them an opportunity to present their objections.”  
Mullane, 339 U.S. at 314.  Put another way, the notice of a 
class settlement “should contain sufficient information to 
enable class members to make informed decisions on whether 
they should take steps.”  In re Baby Prods., 708 F.3d at 180.   
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 The class notice here was sufficient to comply with 
due process.  The notice advised that the NFL would pay 
attorneys’ fees from a separate fund and not object to an 
award up to $112.5 million and that the District Court would 
consider fees after final approval and afford retired players an 
opportunity to object.  From this, class members knew from 
where the fees for class counsel were coming (a separate 
fund), what the NFL’s position on fees would be (no 
objection up to $112.5 million), and could ballpark the size of 
class counsel’s eventual fee request (a betting person would 
say it will be close to $112.5 million).  Even if the class 
members were missing certain information—for example, the 
number of hours class counsel worked and the terms of any 
contingency fee arrangements class counsel have with 
particular retired players—they still had enough information 
to make an informed decision about whether to object to or 
opt out from the settlement.   
 To be sure, we are sympathetic to concerns that others 
have raised over the practice of delaying consideration of a 
fee motion.  As one treatise put it,  
[a] primary concern about class action 
settlements is that unmonitored class counsel 
may have incentives to sell out the class’s 
interests in return for a large fee.  To assess 
whether such a sell-out has occurred, class 
members need information both about the 
content of the settlement and about the scope of 
the fee.  In this sense, fee notice not only may 
accompany settlement notice; it likely should 
accompany settlement notice. 
Newberg on Class Actions § 8:22 (5th ed.) (emphases in 
original).  Delaying the fee petition denies class members 
information about what their counsel did in negotiating the 
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settlement.  And, all else being equal, the more information 
available the better.  Moreover, class members may have less 
incentive to object to the fee award at a later time because 
approval of the settlement will have already occurred.  But 
the procedure is not necessarily a violation of Rule 23(h), and 
in this instance it did not violate due process. 
 B. Clear Sailing Provision 
 Objectors next challenge the provision in the 
settlement agreement that the NFL would not object to a fee 
award up to $112.5 million.  This is often referred to as a 
“clear sailing provision” (probably because the implication is 
that the fee request stands a much better chance of court 
approval if the defendant is not objecting).  The concern with 
a clear sailing provision is collusion.  The defendant is 
indifferent to the allocation of its liability between the class 
and counsel; all that matters is the total liability.  To forgo the 
opportunity to object to the fee award, the defendant will 
presumably want something in return because it is giving up 
the chance to reduce its overall liability.  We thus might fear 
that class counsel has given away something of value to the 
class in return for the defendant’s agreement not to contest a 
fee request below a certain level.   
 Despite these concerns, “numerous cases . . . have 
approved agreements containing such clear-sailing clauses.”  
In re Oil Spill by Oil Rig Deepwater Horizon, 295 F.R.D. 
112, 138 (E.D. La. 2013).  We join our sister circuits in 
declining to hold that clear sailing provisions are per se bars 
to settlement approval while nonetheless emphasizing that 
they deserve careful scrutiny in any class action settlement.  
See In re Sw. Airlines Voucher Litig., 799 F.3d 701, 712 (7th 
Cir. 2015); Gooch v. Life Inv’rs Ins. Co. of Am., 672 F.3d 
402, 426 (6th Cir. 2012); In re Bluetooth Headset Prods. 
Liab. Litig., 654 F.3d 935, 949 (9th Cir. 2011); Blessing v. 
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Sirius XM Radio Inc., 507 F. App’x 1, 4 (2d Cir. 2012); 
Weinberger v. Great N. Nekoosa Corp., 925 F.2d 518, 525 
(1st Cir. 1991).  A district court faced with such a provision 
in a class action settlement should review the process and 
substance of the settlement and satisfy itself that the 
agreement does not indicate collusion or otherwise pose a 
problem.     
 The District Court here found the clear sailing 
provision unobjectionable.  It emphasized that the issue of 
fees was not discussed until after the principal terms of the 
settlement were agreed to, the fee award will not diminish 
class recovery, and the agreed amount is just over 10% of the 
estimated class recovery.  In re Nat’l Football League 
Players’ Concussion Injury Litig., 307 F.R.D. at 374–75.  We 
discern no abuse of discretion.  There is simply no evidence 
in the negotiation process or the final terms of the settlement 
that class counsel bargained away the claims of retired 
players in return for their own fees.   
 
 
 
VIII. CONCLUSION 
 It is the nature of a settlement that some will be 
dissatisfied with the ultimate result.  Our case is no different, 
and we do not doubt that objectors are well-intentioned in 
making thoughtful arguments against certification of the class 
and approval of this settlement.  They aim to ensure that the 
claims of retired players are not given up in exchange for 
anything less than a generous settlement agreement 
negotiated by very able representatives.  But they risk making 
 70 
 
the perfect the enemy of the good.  This settlement will 
provide nearly $1 billion in value to the class of retired 
players.  It is a testament to the players, researchers, and 
advocates who have worked to expose the true human costs 
of a sport so many love.  Though not perfect, it is fair.   
 In sum, we affirm because we are satisfied that the 
District Court ably exercised its discretion in certifying the 
class and approving the settlement.   
